In The Promise of Modern Life Professor D. W. Gotshalk calls our attention to the sickness of modern society--its crises, panic, tensions and fears--and asks, "How did we get this way and what are the prospects of moving out?" He recognizes a disease, offers a diagnosis, and suggests a cure. The causes of our distressing condition lie, in part, in the past, that is, in the assumptions made by previous periods of society. In modern life we can distinguish three periods (...) each with a predominant value, namely, individuality, creativity, and interrelatedness. "We live today in an interrelational world, and the clue to maximum human good lies in developing the value possibilities of the interrelational principle." Individuality characterizes roughly the period of revolutionary changes following the medieval world to the late 18th century; creativity from the late 18th century to recent decades. Both individuality and creativity were heretical in the medieval value scheme, the first leading to pride, and the second to rebellion against established truth. Individuality is rather loosely defined as self-assertion and the striving for self-completeness; creativity seems to mean a kind of activity having a direction or aim, a striving for productive novelty. (shrink)

This seems to me to be the proper attitude to take toward philosophical proposals about the way things are; they are "likely stories" or "likely accounts," although it is true some speculative philosophers, for example, Spinoza and Hegel, did not think of their systems in such a modest way. Now naturalism strives to be a systematic philosophy, an account of the way things are. Its expression as a philosophy is often loose, although frequent attempts are made to give it internal (...) consistency. One of the loosest and untidiest presentations of a naturalistic philosophy is found in Hans Christian Sandbeck's book, Nature and Destiny. And in another work by William R. Dennes, Some Dilemmas of Naturalism, we see an effort to examine some of the internal difficulties of the system. I intend to examine both in detail; in addition, I will offer some brief comments on Francis Haber's book, The Age of the World, which gives part of the history of naturalism. (shrink)

At the beginning of the twentieth century, philosophy in America and England began to respond to the rumors of unrest and dissatisfaction which were under way at the close of the nineteenth century. Many contemporary thinkers, who have had occasion to look backward, have remarked on the dominance of idealism at the turn of the period. Montague says it was “rampant” and points to the organization of the St. Louis school by W. T. Harris, the purpose being a study of (...) Hegelian thought. Lovejoy also remembers the total sweep of idealistic thought. “The metaphysics of the philosophical teachers whose influence was dominant in most of the American universities thirty-five years ago had one common and fundamental premise which was supposed to be established beyond the possibility of reasonable doubt; to question it was simply to betray one's want of a genuine initiation into philosophy. It was the proposition that, in Bradley's words, 'to be real, or even barely to exist, is to fall within sentience; sentient experience, in short, is reality, and what is not this is not real. There is no being or fact outside of that which is commonly called psychical existence.' As my first teacher in philosophy, George Holmes Howison, said, in summing up a memorable philosophical symposium in 1895: 'We are all agreed' in one 'great tenet;' which is 'the entire foundation of philosophy itself: the explanation of the world which maintains that the only thing absolutely real is mind; that all material and all temporal existences take their being from Consciousness that thinks and experiences; that out of consciousness they all issue, to the consciousness they are presented, and that presence to consciousness constitutes their entire reality.' With almost a whole generation of acute and powerful minds this passed for a virtual axiom.”. (shrink)